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INTRODUCTION
Long-distance marriages were once characterized by letter-writing,
with weeks or months passing before another communication from one’s
partner would arrive. With the advent of virtual communication technologies,
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including telephone calls, instant messaging, and e-mails, this
communication has become instantaneous. Furthermore, Skype and virtual
reality allow for face-to-face, real-time contact. As this technology advances,
more and more people will inevitably conduct their marriages virtually.
Despite the use of virtual communication technology to help
individuals create and maintain authentic relationships online, courts,
regulators, and legislators have not recognized this technology in the
immigration and marriage context. Instead, they have required couples to
actually reside together and used physical separation as proof of fraudulent
marriages. This is especially problematic for immigrants, as one of the
primary ways immigrants obtain lawful presence and citizenship in the
United States is through marriage. However, these marriages must be
authentic in the eyes of the state, and U.S. courts have consistently refused to
recognize the authenticity of marriages in which the couple communicates
over the Internet.
This lack of recognition of virtually conducted marriages can be
traced to the U.S. government’s historic treatment of immigration as a system
of exclusion, family separation, and policing of fraud as well as the institution
of marriage. Because marriage is a path to citizenship and both immigration
and marriage are such heavily policed institutions, the U.S. government is
disincentivized to expand its definition of what constitutes a “real” marriage.
Regardless, this lack of recognition penalizes couples who conduct their
relationship in an increasingly common format—physically apart and online.
Despite the flexibility of some courts to allow periods of physical separation,
the U.S. immigration system still overwhelmingly privileges relationships in
which couples live together over relationships that make extensive use of
virtual communication technology to bridge physical separation.
The immigration system’s treatment of this technology starkly
contrasts with how the child custody system has embraced it to allow for
parents to create virtual visitation plans. While the immigration system has
largely been silent or antagonistic towards virtual communication
technology, courts have encouraged its use in child custody to maintain
meaningful connections between parents and children who live apart. Not
only do courts make use of this technology in the child custody system, they
recognize its ability to foster emotional closeness.
In Section I of this Comment, I discuss virtual communication
technology’s capacity to bridge physical distance. In Section II, I explore
scholarship on the ability of this technology to maintain and facilitate new
forms of intimacy. In Section III, I review how courts, federal agencies, and
Congress have treated physical separation for immigrant couples applying for
permanent residency and citizenship through marriage. I assert that although
some courts interpret the law in this area more expansively, generally the
authenticity of a marriage between an immigrant and U.S. citizen is
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questioned more searchingly if there are periods of physical separation in their
relationship. In Section IV, I examine some of the policy motivations behind
the immigration system and how they can provide context for this area of the
law. In Section V, I compare the immigration system’s treatment of virtual
communication technology to the child custody system’s treatment of the same
technology. I argue that differences between the two systems provide insight
into why immigration has been less receptive to this technology. In Section VI,
I provide recommendations for how the immigration system can better
recognize the validity of relationships that are conducted online.
I. VIRTUAL COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY’S USAGE AND CAPABILITIES
Virtual communication technology can be defined as “any technology
people use to communicate with each other when they can’t be face to face.” 1
This broad definition includes technologies like email, text message, video
chat services (like Skype and FaceTime), and phone calls. For the purposes of
this Comment, non-instantaneous communications like letters are excluded
from this definition. Although letters do allow people to communicate while
physically apart, their production does not involve the use of technology, and
their non-instantaneous nature changes how they impact relationships. For
example, text messages allow for constant back-and-forth communication
between partners who are physically separated, which facilitates a different
connection than letters that can take weeks to arrive.
This technology has revolutionized the way people interact with one
another and has become widespread globally. It has opened doors for instant
communication between people who are located thousands of miles apart. For
example, Skype was one of the pioneering technologies that allowed users to
make cheap voice calls, video calls, and chat, all over an online platform.2 In less
than ten years since its inception in 2003, global users reached 300 million. 3
Since Skype was popularized, more and more technologies have entered the
market that facilitate virtual communication, including WhatsApp, Viber,
Google+ Hangouts, and ooVoo, among others. 4 Furthermore, as of 2019, it is

1

Cheryl A. Frost, What is Virtual Communication Technology?, TECHWALLA,
https://www.techwalla.com/articles/what-is-virtual-communication-technology [https://perma.
cc/B2S2-HR7Z] (last visited Nov. 9, 2019).
2
Ken Yeung, Skype is 10 Years Old, and in the Past Decade It’s Helped Transform the Way
That We Communicate, TNW (Aug. 29, 2013), https://thenextweb.com/Microsoft/2013/08/
29/skype-is-10-years-old-and-in-the-past-decade-its-helped-transform-the-way-that-we-com
municate [https://perma.cc/K3BE-KGM3].
3
Id.
4
See id. (discussing how WhatsApp and similar companies have emerged as competitors to Skype).
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estimated that over five billion people globally have mobile devices. 5 As of
2018, the median rate of social media usage is over 50 percent.6 It should be
noted that mobile technology is more common in the developed world, and
among young people and well-educated people.7 Still, all of these statistics
show that virtual communication technology has become commonplace, and
therefore much of human communication now lives virtually.
Virtual communication technology will only advance in the future,
especially with the advent of virtual reality. Virtual reality can be defined as
“a technology by which computer-aided stimuli create the immersive illusion
of being somewhere else . . . .” 8 Using an apparatus like a headset, virtual
reality promises to remove the screen barrier of current virtual
communication technology and allow participants to enter into a virtual
world.9 In this virtual world, people can interact with digital versions of other
people.10 They can see other people’s gestures and expressions, mimicking
the sense of being in the same physical space. 11 These technological advances
only make it more likely that people will communicate virtually and be able
to conduct full relationships while physically separated.
II. VIRTUAL COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY’S IMPACT ON
COUPLE RELATIONALITY
In order to adequately assess immigration law’s preferencing of
couples who reside in the same physical space, the assumption behind that
prioritization must first be addressed – the assumption that the intimacy and
authenticity of a couple’s relationship are exclusively negatively impacted
when that relationship exists primarily online. This assumption speaks to
broader questions about how technology, specifically virtual interaction
technology, has affected the way couples relate to one another.
5

Laura Silver, Smartphone Ownership Is Growing Rapidly Around the World, but Not Always
Equally, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2019), https://pewresearch.org/global/2019/02/05/smart
phone-ownership-is-growing-rapidly-around-the-world-but-not-always-equally [https://perma
.cc/V2WB-8RFD].
6
Jacob Poushter, Caldwell Bishop & Hanyu Chwe, Social Media Use Continues to Rise in
Developing Countries but Plateaus Across Developed Ones, PEW RES. CTR. (June 19, 2018),
https://pewresearch.org/global/2018/06/19/social-media-use-continues-to-rise-in-developingcountries-but-plateaus-across-developed-ones [https://perma.cc/U2J9-GUQZ].
7
Silver, supra note 5.
8
Peter Rubin & Jess Grey, The WIRED Guide to Virtual Reality, WIRED (Mar. 8, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-to-virtual-reality/ [https://perma.cc/YR2C-QBCB].
9
See id. (discussing the development and future prospects of virtual reality).
10
Elizabeth Shockman, How Advances in Virtual Communication Technology Will Change
How We Work and Communicate, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Mar. 14, 2016, 8:45 AM),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-03-14/how-advances-virtual-reality-will-change-how-wework-and-communicate [https://perma.cc/6DCQ-9DWG].
11
Id.
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Few scholars have written on this topic (79 of over 11,000 articles
published in couple and family therapy journals between 1996 and 2010 were
about technology),12 but those who have agree that virtual interaction
technologies can help strengthen romantic partnerships. Most obviously, this
technology allows couples separated by physical distance to communicate
with one another. Internet technology can approximate real-life interactions,
with users delivering similar verbal cues as they would in person.13 Beyond
approximation, some scholars have found that technological advances can
enhance intimacy in relationships.14 Online technologies allow for more
frequent communication on different platforms, from texting to calling to
Skype.15 More frequent communication facilitates greater self-disclosure about
one’s daily life and emotions, which in turn builds stronger commitment to one
another and satisfaction in the relationship. 16 Furthermore, computer users are
less inhibited in their online interactions, which encourages greater
intimacy.17 While some may argue that intimacy requires shared space and
cohabitation, these scholars have found evidence that suggests physical
distance and emotional closeness are not mutually exclusive.
The results of these studies, indicating that online relationships have the
potential to be even more intimate than in-person relationships, undermine the
immigration system’s assumption that these relationships are any less able to be
“real.” Virtual communication technology has changed the way relationships are
conducted, allowing for intimacy to develop and be maintained beyond the
confines of occupying the same physical space. In other words, virtual
relationships can be just as authentic as relationships in which couples live
together. Additionally, because of the inherently transnational nature of
immigrants’ relationships with U.S. citizens, many of these relationships might
have to rely on technology to maintain any sort of relationship at all.
A study on Filipino seamen’s wives demonstrates these findings in
practice. Prepaid phone cards have made mobile communication widely
accessible in the Philippines, allowing wives to communicate frequently with
their husbands abroad via cell phones.18 Compared to the previous method of
12

Katherine M. Hertlein, Digital Dwelling: Technology in Couple and Family Relationships,
61 FAM. REL. 374, 374 (2012).
13
Id. at 377.
14
See id. at 380 ("Participation in online activities can enhance intimacy and feelings of
closeness between partners . . . .”).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See id. (asserting that enhanced intimacy from participating in online activities is due in part to
online communications being less inhibited than face-to-face communications).
18
See Roderick G. Galam, Communication and Filipino Seamen’s Wives Imagined
Communion and the Intimacy of Absence, 60 PHIL. STUD.: HIST. & ETHNOGRAPHIC
VIEWPOINTS 223, 235–36 (2012) (contending that prepaid phone cards have made mobile
phone calls more affordable, and therefore have improved communication between spouses).
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sending letters, phones are easier, faster, and help couples adjust better to
separation.19 The constant cell phone communication enables seamen to
maintain a presence in the family, even when they are not physically
available.20 Furthermore, text messaging preserves intimacy in these
relationships because it allows spouses to express their affection for each
other through words.21 The spread of mobile communication technology
means that seamen not only can remain involved in the daily lives of their
families, but also can strengthen and build their relationships. 22 Although
phones might facilitate real-time conflict between spouses, it has also allowed
couples to create a space of “imagined communion” where their relationship
and intimacy continue to grow.23
For members of the Caribbean diaspora, in which family members are
spread throughout the world, technology is a powerful tool to stay connected
to one another and maintain intimate relationships. Among these
communities, social media is used to provide caregiving transnationally.24 For
example, when there is a familial crisis, social media provides a web of
extended kinship networks that can easily be tapped to come up with a
solution.25 Platforms like Facebook also open up new avenues for familial
connection. For example, giving family members abroad access to personal
photo albums allows them to experience events vicariously for which they
might not have been physically present, even if everyone lived in the same
physical space.26 Although these findings did not specifically apply to spousal
relationships, they still provide evidence that relationships maintained crossnationally can flourish online and even find new forms of expression.
Of course, distance and intimacy mediated through a screen can
negatively impact a relationship. Traveling to see one another is resourceintensive, and physical distance can impact the intimacy and familiarity
couples have with one another. 27 However, as both the examples of Filipino
19

Id. at 236.
Id. at 238.
21
Id. at 250.
22
Id. at 254–55.
23
Id. at 224, 247, 254–55.
24
See Dwaine Plaza & Amy Below, Social Media as a Tool for Transnational Caregiving Within
the Caribbean Diaspora, 63 SOC. & ECON. STUD. 25, 38 (2014) (noting that many families in the
study used a “transnational multi-generational care model” of electronic communication).
25
Id. at 38–39.
26
See id. at 41 (highlighting an example in which an uncle living in Trinidad could see photos
of his nephew in Canada at social events that the uncle could not have appropriately
attended—even if living in Canada—on account of underage drinking and drug use).
27
See generally Stephen J. Betchen, Four Problems with Long Distance Relationships,
PSYCHOL. TODAY (June 14, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/magneticpartners/201506/4-problems-long-distance-relationships [https://perma.cc/X5GX-YYG6]
20
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seamen and the Caribbean diaspora show, distance is not determinative.
These examples reinforce that online relationships can be just as “real” as the
relationships that are maintained in the same physical space. In fact, they can
create new ways of relating to one another that are just as intimate as the
bonds formed in real life.
III. CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The immigration system in the United States is a dense web of federal
statutes, administrative law, and common law. I do not attempt to summarize
all of it in this section, but rather provide a cursory overview of the
mechanisms by which someone can attain citizenship through marriage. At
multiple points in the process, marriages are interrogated to see if they are
“shams,” and physically residing together is seen as evidence (and for some
courts, a prerequisite) to prove a relationship’s authenticity. Throughout my
research, I did not encounter any cases, guidance, policy statements, statutes
or regulations that discussed virtual communication technology and how that
impacts the use of cohabitation as evidence in immigration proceedings.
For most applicants, there are two stages in the application for U.S.
citizenship through marriage: application for permanent residency as a
spouse to U.S. citizen, and if that application is successful, then a second
application for naturalization to become a U.S. citizen. Some spouses of U.S.
citizens employed abroad can become naturalized without having previously
been permanent residents. 28
A. Legal Treatment of Permanent Residency Through Marriage
For the first stage, immigrants are expected to file a Form I-130,
Petition for Alien Relative, in addition to Form I-485 Application to Register
Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (if the spouse is already in the United
States and partnered to a U.S. citizen). 29 Form I-130 is intended to “establish
[a U.S. citizen or permanent resident’s] relationship to an eligible relative
who wishes to come to or remain in the United States permanently.” 30 As
(explaining that time and money resources can wear on long-distance relationships, that high
familiarity is important for relationship success, and that long distance can impact the level
of intimacy in a relationship).
28
See 8 U.S.C. § 1430(b), 1430(d) (outlining paths to citizenship not requiring permanent
residence for spouses of U.S. government employees, employees of certain organizations,
and surviving immediate family members of deceased members of the armed forces).
29
Bringing Spouses to Live in the United States as Permanent Residents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/family/family-us-citizens/bringing-spouses-liveunited-states-permanent-residents [https://perma.cc/5LPM-J9E5] (last updated Feb. 2, 2018).
30
I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://
www.uscis.gov/i-130 [https://perma.cc/RUC9-HEXA] (last updated Oct. 26, 2020).
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evidence to show the “bona fides” of a marriage, the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) mentions that applicants can present a “lease
showing joint tenancy of a common residence, meaning [the spouses] live at
the same address together.”31 Although there is no requirement to live
together to obtain permanent residency, there is an assumption that living
together makes a relationship more likely to be authentic.
Some courts and adjudicative bodies have been receptive to the
possibility that real marriages can involve long periods of physical
separation. In Matter of Lenning, the Board of Immigration Appeals stated
that “where the parties enter into a valid marriage, and there is nothing to
show that they have since obtained a legal separation or dissolution of that
marriage, a visa petition . . . should not be denied solely because the parties
are not residing together.”32 Although the Board ultimately denied the visa
petition in that case, its reasoning still provides the opportunity for noncohabitating couples to successfully have their marriages legally recognized
as authentic.33 This holding acknowledges that living together is not the
linchpin that determines whether a marriage is a sham.
The court in Boansi v. Johnson took the Lenning reasoning further,
criticizing the government for relying too heavily on the couple living apart
as evidence that the marriage was fraudulent. 34 In this case, Dr. Boansi (a
Ghanaian national) married Ms. McNeil (an American citizen). 35 After
marriage, Dr. Boansi tried to find a job near Ms. McNeil, but he ended up
securing a job apart from her. 36 Because she did not want to be away from
her sick father and Dr. Boansi saw his job as temporary, they decided to live
apart but visit each other on their time off.37 The court admonished the
government for ignoring these legitimate reasons for living apart, and said
the government “den[ied] Dr. Boansi’s applications because he and his wife
had an unusual living arrangement.” 38 Like Lenning, the court’s reasoning
demonstrated that it was thinking about marriages holistically, recognizing
that couples can sustain authentic marriages while living apart.
However, many courts have also affirmed the government’s
assumption that separate living situations is evidence of a sham marriage. In
Reynoso v. Holder, the court concluded that the Board of Immigration
31

Id.
Matter of Lenning, 17 I. & N. Dec. 476, 477 (1980).
33
Id. at 479.
34
See Boansi v. Johnson, 118 F. Supp. 3d 875, 881 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (finding that the
government “paid little attention to the couple's rationale for living apart or any other
evidence submitted in support of the couple's legitimate marriage,” resting its decision
instead on “insinuation and inference.”).
35
Id. at 877.
36
Id. at 878.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 881.
32
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Appeals correctly determined that a couple’s marriage was not entered in
good faith.39 As evidence, the court pointed out the fact that “there were no
contemporaneous documents evidencing [the couple’s] cohabitation.”40 The
court also pointed to testimonial inconsistencies about the exact timeline of
cohabitation.41 Similarly, in Abuya v. Sessions, testimonial inconsistencies
about when the couple lived together led the court to determine that substantial
evidence supported that their marriage was fraudulent.42 Furthermore, despite
some courts’ recognition that living apart does not categorically preclude the
existence of a genuine marriage, even these courts recognize that it can
damage a couple’s case. In Boansi, the court explicitly said that “parties who
do not reside together may be held to a higher standard.” 43 This additional
burden on couples who live apart shows that the court sees these couples as
inherently less likely to be real. If courts viewed physically separated couples
and couples who resided together in the same light, there would be no reason
to treat them differently for the purposes of immigration decisions.
B. Legal Treatment of Naturalization Through Marriage
Although living together is important for obtaining permanent
residency through marriage, there is strong statutory language that makes it
particularly crucial for successful naturalization. To become naturalized as a
U.S. citizen, generally applicants must be “resid[ing] continuously, after
being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for
at least three years, and during the three years immediately preceding the date
of filing [their] application ha[ve] been living in marital union with the citizen
spouse.”44 This citizen spouse must have “been physically present in the
United States for periods totaling at least half of that time and ha[ve] resided
within the State or the district of the Service in the United States in which the
applicant filed his application for at least three months.”45 Like the application
for permanent residency, there is a strong assumption in the naturalization
process that residing in the same place is evidence that a relationship is real.
The statutory definition of the “in marital union” requirement for
naturalization through marriage has been contested. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), in one of its regulations promulgated pursuant to
the Immigration and Nationality Act, defined martial union as “actually

39

Reynoso v. Holder, 711 F.3d 199, 213 (1st Cir. 2013).
Id. at 204.
41
Id. at 207.
42
Abuya v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 650, 654–55 (8th Cir. 2017).
43
Boansi, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 880.
44
8 U.S.C. § 1430(a).
45
Id.
40
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resid[ing] with his or her current spouse.”46 They also stipulated, in that same
regulation, that spouses can still be naturalized if “the applicant and spouse live
apart because of circumstances beyond their control, such as military service
in the Armed Forces of the United States or essential business or occupational
demands, rather than because of voluntary legal or informal separation.”47
Informal separations are “evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether it is sufficient enough to signify the dissolution of the marital
union.”48 Although the DHS recognizes that couples can be physically apart
and still be considered “in marital union,” the general rule still defines marital
unions as relationships in which the couple resides together.
Courts have also weighed in on the statutory marital union
requirement, and some courts have chosen to interpret the Immigration and
Nationality Act’s “in marital union” requirement and its exceptions more
expansively. The court in In re Olan asserted that this requirement means that
couples must “liv[e] in the status of a valid marriage.”49 In this case, a couple
lived together continuously, but had a two and a half month gap where
petitioner’s spouse left the home after a fight, continued to periodically visit,
but did not fully return to live at their shared home. 50 The court did not see
this temporary separation as an issue because it interpreted “marital union”
as a status that transcends two people physically being in the same place. 51
In Paiva v. Curda, the court interpreted DHS’s regulations around the
“in marital union” requirement and its exceptions to allow physically
separated couples to still apply for naturalization. 52 The case addressed the
denial of a naturalization application for a permanent resident after a couple,
including one U.S. citizen and one permanent resident, informally
separated.53 The government claimed that DHS’s case-by-case evaluation of
informally separated couples only applied to couples living under the same
roof.54 The court disagreed with the government’s interpretation and viewed
DHS’s language more expansively, reasoning that it applies to any informal
separation, not just informal separations where the couple still lives
together.55 It also explicitly noted that “real marriages—meaning
nonfraudulent ones—may involve situations where the spouses do not live
together, whether for informal separations with the intention to remain
46

8 C.F.R. § 319.1(b)(1) (2020).
Id. § 319.1(b)(2)(ii)(C).
48
Id. § 319.1(b)(2)(ii)(B).
49
257 F. Supp. 884, 890 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
50
Id. at 887–89.
51
See id. at 891 (holding that the marital union is a bond that does not dissolve with physical
separation).
52
162 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1058–59, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
53
Id. at 1058–59.
54
Id. at 1060–61.
55
Id. at 1066.
47
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validly married . . . or for involuntary separations where the couple is validly
married but one spouse is deployed in the military or working abroad.”56
Furthermore, “there are surely many variations of sleeping and living
arrangements that are appropriately considered ‘living in marital union.’” 57
Here, the court recognizes that married couples’ partnerships take many
forms, and physical separation does not preclude an authentic relationship.
As in Paiva, the court in United States v. Onabanjo did not see the statutory
residence requirement as absolute. They saw the residency requirement as a
general rule that applied to most couples, but was subject to certain
exceptions for periods of separation. 58
Other courts have been more restrictive with how they interpret the
INA’s “in marital union” language. In United States v. Maduno, the court stated
that short periods of temporary separation (like going on vacations) are allowed,
and the couple can still be considered living in marital union.59 However, the
couple in Maduno was physically separated for years, and the court thought
this period of separation precluded them from fulfilling the INA’s statutory
requirement.60
Likewise, the court in United States v. Moses said that “[i]t is clear
that ‘living in marital union’ indicates that the couple live together in a marital
state.”61 Rejecting the rule in Olan, the court said that marital union requires
more than just a marital status.62 The court recognized that there are
exceptions to the requirement of residing together, but varying testimony in
the case showed that different INS officials do not always recognize these
exceptions.63 One INS assistant director for examinations testified that
physical separation would lead to additional questions, but not preclude
naturalization.64 Another INS examiner testified that if the applicant had
informed her that he did not currently live with his spouse, she would have told
him he did not qualify for naturalization, without any further questioning.65

56

Id. at 1067.
Id.
58
See 351 F.3d 1064, 1067 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court erred in not
considering the applicability of exceptions in DHS’s regulation on the INA’s “in marital
union” requirement).
59
40 F.3d 1212, 1216–17 (11th Cir. 1994).
60
Id. at 1217.
61
94 F.3d 182, 185 (5th Cir. 1996).
62
Id. at 186.
63
Id.
64
See id. (testifying that “a separation ‘would raise a question that we’d have to look into’
to establish ‘whether there was a legal separation, which would raise the bar under that
section; if it was an informal separation, what was the reason for the separation . . . in an
effort to determine that the marriage was bona fide.’”).
65
Id.
57
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Both testimonies, and ultimately the court, relied on the assumption that lack
of cohabitation meant that a relationship was less likely to be real.
In Li Dang Ding v. Gulick, physical residence together was decisive.
Shioura, a U.S. citizen, married Ding, a Chinese national, allowing Ding to gain
permanent residency.66 In August 2004, Shioura moved to Hawaii for a new
job.67 Ding moved to Hawaii, but returned to live in California in fall 2005.68
The court acknowledged that Ding went to Hawaii for multiple trips that lasted
months, but concludes that those trips were visits because Ding resided in
California.69 The court did not find their joint ownership of property, their
child, and their shared names on documents compelling.70 Instead, the court
fixated on the INS requirement that the couple “actually resided together”
and interpreted that requirement as physically being in the same place. 71
Much like how physical separation is treated in the permanent
residency context, there is a strong presumption in the naturalization context
that living apart will make a court less likely to recognize the validity of a
couple’s relationship. There is regulatory language that requires “actually
resid[ing]” together, with some exceptions for voluntary and involuntary
separations.72 Courts seem to look at cases holistically, placing varying levels
of importance on physical separation as evidence. Despite this flexibility,
there still seems to be an underlying assumption that couples are less likely
to be in real relationships if they do not physically reside together.
However, in all of these cases, regulations, and statutes, there was still
no discussion of the ways in which individuals can foster genuine
relationships with the help of virtual communication technology. Although
courts are divided about how essential residing together is for demonstrating
the authenticity of a marital relationship, they all operate under the strong
statutory presumption that a relationship is less likely to be real if spouses do
not live in the same place. Even courts that interpret the statutory
requirements more expansively—having made decisions since virtual
communication technology became commonplace—have not discussed this
technology or pointed to the use of it as evidence of the authenticity of a
marriage. It is possible that virtually conducted relationships have been
addressed in administrative adjudications that do not lead to litigation, and
therefore will not be memorialized in court opinions. Still, there is little
formal legal recognition of how much virtual communication technology has
revolutionized the way we communicate, how the intimacy of romantic
66

Civil No. 11-00070 SOM-BMK, 2012 WL 300475, at *3 (D. Haw. Jan. 31, 2012).
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at *12.
70
Id. at *13.
71
Id.
72
8 C.F.R. § 319.1(b)(1)–(2) (2020).
67
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relationships can be created and maintained online, and how that should
impact court and administrative agencies’ determinations of which marriages
are shams and which marriages are genuine.
IV. CONTEXTUALIZING THE MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE IMMIGRATION
SYSTEM’S INTERROGATION OF MARRIAGE
When discussing the immigration system’s treatment of marriage, it
is important to recognize that the state is not just narrowly trying to prove the
authenticity of relationships; it is also trying to identify fraud against the state,
police the institution of marriage, and police who enters the United States and
has a claim to citizenship. Understanding these motivations helps explain the
way the state interrogates relationships and why it would be hesitant to
recognize virtual relationships as real relationships.
In the United States, marriage fraud is considered a crime. 73 More
specifically, “[a]ny individual who knowingly enters into a marriage for the
purpose of evading any provision of the immigration laws shall be
imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or fined not more than $250,000, or
both.”74 Similarly, making false statements on immigration documents is
punishable by up to 15 years in prison (or 25 years, if the false statement was
used to facilitate terrorism). 75 Because of the possibility of lengthy prison
time, it is clear that the state treats marriage fraud as a serious offense.
A brochure from U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
on marriage fraud further demonstrates the state’s view of the
interconnectedness of immigration, marriage, fraud, and crime. 76 The
brochure provides a number to report suspected cases of marriage fraud to
the Homeland Security Investigations Tip Line and includes a photo of a
prison hallway juxtaposed against a church aisle set up for a wedding. 77 It
also states that “[m]arriage fraud is not a victimless, innocent crime” and that
it “trad[es] America’s security for financial gain.” 78 According to ICE’s
brochure, marriage fraud “weakens our nation’s security and makes us less
safe” because “[t]errorists and other criminals can use marriage fraud as a
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8 U.S.C. § 1325(c); see 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (making it a crime to make false statements
on documents required by immigration laws).
74
8 U.S.C. § 1325(c).
75
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).
76
HOMELAND SEC. INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, MARRIAGE FRAUD
IS A FED. CRIME, 1–2 (Jun. 2016), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Doc
ument/2016/marriageFraudBrochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PJ6-G2Z6]. It is meaningful to
note that this brochure was released in June 2016, before the Trump administration took
control of ICE.
77
Id. at 1.
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Id. at 2.
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vehicle to enter the United States.” 79 This punitive, enforcement-focused
language shows one of the lenses by which the U.S. government views
couples entering the United States. In the eyes of the U.S. government, these
couples are not simply trying to immigrate to the United States; they are also
potential suspects of criminal fraud and terrorism.
Kerry Abrams, in her article “Marriage Fraud,” explains this policing
of immigrating couples as a function of the substantial benefit that is received
through marriage. Public benefits become tied to marriage because
lawmakers believe the long-term, committed nature of a marriage makes that
couple deserving of benefits.80 If lawmakers think marital status by itself does
not provide “an adequate proxy” for long-term commitment with respect to
the benefit being provided, then the state will adopt more stringent tests to
assess the validity of the marriage. 81 Because the immigration system confers
lawful presence in the United States and couples are able to divorce relatively
easily after getting a green card, marriage in the immigration context is more
vulnerable to fraud; therefore, the state polices it more heavily than marriage
in other contexts.82
Abrams also reasons that lawmakers see marriage fraud as harming
the public, which motivates them to take state action to combat it. 83 In the
eyes of the state, fraudulent marriages can harm the public by taking benefits
away from the public that might have been used by someone else, and by
allowing people into the country who otherwise would not have been eligible
for entry.84 Marriage also serves an assimilative function, and fraudulent
marriages open the doors for less deserving immigrants who have not gone
through that acculturation.85 In other words, legitimatizing marriage serves a
gatekeeping function to keep out immigrants who do not deserve citizenship
in the eyes of the state. These theories of harm help contextualize why the
state is so preoccupied with proving the authenticity of marriage.
Furthermore, U.S. immigration law has used definitions of marriage
to exclude certain classes of immigrants based on their race, gender, and
perceived moral character. 86 Immigration officials use a Western definition
of marriage to make decisions about who can enter the country lawfully;
those that fit that definition are allowed in, while those who do not are
79
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Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2012).
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Id. at 38.
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Id. at 38–39.
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Id. at 49.
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Id. at 54.
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Id. at 53–54.
86
See Noga Firstenberg, Marriage and Morality: Examining the International Marriage
Broker Regulation Act, 18 ASIAN AM. L.J. 83, 111–112 (2011) (asserting that definitions of
marriage were essential components of developing immigration policy, and this policy was
used to discriminate against immigrants because of their character and culture).
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excluded.87 This privileging of certain kinds of marriages is reflected in U.S.
immigration regulations that emphasize children and joint ownership of
property, which are unattainable or undesired for many marriages outside
of the United States.88
The International Marriage Broker Regulation Act (IMBRA) is
another example of the ways in which the state enhances scrutiny of
marriages that fall outside of normative definitions of marriage. IMBRA adds
regulatory burdens to marriages that are facilitated by international marriage
brokers.89 The intention of the legislation is to prevent potentially exploitative
relationships, but IMBRA also can be tied to the historical restrictions
preventing Asian women from immigrating to the United States.90 Asian
women make up a large percentage of international marriage broker marriages
and have historically been sexualized and seen as deviant; IMBRA reinforces
those perceptions by making it more difficult for them to come to the United
States. Preserving the sanctity of a white, Western definition of marriage and
exerting moral judgment on those who fall outside of those boundaries are
more reasons why the state polices the validity of marriage in the immigration
context so heavily.91 Both IMBRA and the privileging of certain components
of marriage, like the joint ownership of property, reinforce the immigration
system’s efforts to exclude and engage in gatekeeping.
Stephen Lee, in his article “Family Separation as Slow Death,” argues
that the immigration system is characterized by separation.92 Instead of acting
as a tool for transnational families to reunite, U.S. immigration laws are
committed to keeping families apart. 93 Lee asserts that this rule of separation
can be supported by the long wait times that families face before they get
visas to reunite, the stringent enforcement of immigration laws, narrow
opportunities for adjustment of status, and the application of anti–money
laundering laws to immigrants trying to send money to their families
abroad.94 Lee’s argument adds further context to the motivations behind the
immigration system; although the state technically allows families to reunite,
the way its rules are applied instead reflects a motivation to separate families
and maintain their separation.
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Id. at 112.
Id. at 118–19.
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Id. at 84.
90
Id. at 84–85.
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Id. at 85.
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See Stephen Lee, Family Separation as Slow Death, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2319, 2322
(2019) (“[O]ur immigration system is pervasively organized around the principles of
family separation.”).
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See id. at 2323 (“[A] holistic examination of the broader immigration system shows that
the exception of family separations operates much more like the rule . . . .”).
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Beyond the immigration system, marriage is an institution that has
traditionally emphasized cohabitation, and the corresponding assumption of
consummation, which acts to validate the marriage. Many opponents of
same-sex marriage have espoused this traditional conjugal view of marriage,
which defines marriage as “beg[inning] by commitment and sealed by sexual
intercourse” that is rooted in the goal of procreation.95 These opponents assert
that the state’s historical interest in regulating marriage stems from this
traditional view.96 Courts have also validated this relationship between the
legitimacy of marriage, consummation, and cohabitation.97 Some courts have
gone further and invalidated marriages that have not been consummated.98
Applied to the immigration context, when the state polices the boundaries of
marriage and ties it to cohabitation, whether that is through statutory
requirements or higher burdens of proof, it is also reinforcing the traditional
entangling of marriage legitimacy, cohabitation, and consummation.
The background considerations that animate the marriage and
immigration systems help explain how courts make decisions about the
authenticity of relationships. Because marriage conveys immense
immigration benefits and marriage fraud is seen as a serious crime, courts and
administrative agencies are motivated to vigorously interrogate relationships.
Marriage in the immigration context is characterized by enforcement and
restriction, not the desire to expand the pool of people who are eligible for
benefits. Furthermore, the American immigration system, both historically and
presently, has been organized around the principles of immigrant exclusion and
family separation. In this kind of environment, the state is disinclined to view
virtual relationships as real. Despite the ability of virtual communication
technology to foster authentic connections, the state is incentivized to ignore
or deemphasize this ability because of its competing concerns.
V. VIRTUAL COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY’S IMPACT ON CHILD
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS
In child custody and parental visitation, courts and state legislatures
have embraced virtual communication technology as a way to keep both
95

Andrew Forsyth, Defining Marriage, 97 SOUNDINGS: AN INTERDISC. J. 297, 298 (2014).
See id. (arguing that linking marriage to children’s welfare is what motivates the state’s
recognition of marriage as a public good).
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See, e.g., Eldredge v. Eldredge, 43 N.Y.S.2d 796, 797 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (“[T]he mere fact that
a party agrees to and does enter into the marriage contract of itself implies a representation on
his or her part that he or she will consummate the marriage by cohabitation . . . .”).
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See, e.g., Moussa v. INS, 302 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Immigration law does not
recognize the validity of a proxy marriage which has never been consummated . . . .”);
Lawrence Drew Borten, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1089, 1093 (2002) (pointing to court decision language that suggests “marriage
without sex is a sham.”).
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parents in contact with their children when one parent chooses to relocate.
Courts and state legislatures still do not draw an equivalence between the
quality of virtual and physical visitation, but they are much more explicitly
receptive than the immigration system of the possibility of connection being
fostered online. These differences can be explained by the motivations behind
both systems and what is at stake. While child custody is supposed to prioritize
the best interests of the child,99 the immigration system has no similar mandate
to prioritize the best interests of the families impacted by its policies.
McCoy v. McCoy is often acknowledged as a groundbreaking case
because of its incorporation of virtual communication technology in
visitation plans.100 In this case, the parents had joint custody, and the father
had 66 days total visitation time. 101 The mother wanted to move to California
from New Jersey for a job that would have a more stable salary, medical
benefits, and fewer travel hours.102 As part of the visitation plan, the mother
proposed using webcams to allow the father to keep in touch with their child
on a daily basis.103 Although the court did not draw an equivalence between
virtual contact and physical contact,104 it described the webcam solution
proposed by the mother as a “creative and innovative” way to “enhance
visitation.”105 In this case, the court saw virtual contact as lesser than physical
contact, but it also recognized the potential of virtual communication
technology as a medium for maintaining the closeness of familial relationships.
Other courts have also been receptive of the possibility of maintaining
parental bonds online if one parent relocates with the child. In McGuinness
v. McGuinness, the court criticized the lower court for not considering
alternative visitation to accommodate for parental relocation. 106 It elaborated
that “[p]hysical separation does not preclude each parent from maintaining
significant and substantial involvement in a child’s life, which is clearly
desirable. There are alternate methods of maintaining a meaningful
See, e.g., Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) (“The chancellor in exercising
his jurisdiction upon petition . . . acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of
the child. He is to put himself in the position of a ‘wise, affectionate, and careful parent’ . . .
and make provision for the child accordingly.”) (citation omitted).
100
Elisabeth Bach-Van Horn, Virtual Visitation: Are Webcams Being Used as an Excuse to
Allow Relocation?, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 171, 174 (2008).
101
McCoy v. McCoy, 764 A.2d 449, 451 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 451–52.
104
See id. at 454 (“Every time a custodial parent moves to a distant location, the ability of the
noncustodial parent to exercise visitation rights is adversely affected” and it is “obvious” that
“defendant’s relationship will be substantially altered by the move . . . .”).
105
Id. at 454.
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See McGuinness v. McGuinness, 970 P.2d 1078, 1074–83 (Nev. 1998) (“In denying
Teresa’s motion, the district court failed to seriously consider the possibility of reasonable,
alternative visitation and focused on the fact that a move would render the current joint
custody arrangement impossible.”).
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relationship, including telephone calls, e-mail messages, letters, and frequent
visitation.”107 Similarly, the court in Burke v. Burke agreed with the lower
court’s assessment of one parent’s suggestion of virtual visitation as a
“unique, forward thinking and viable communication alternative.” 108
However, courts have not been universally receptive of virtual
visitation. In Nighswander v. Sudick, the court denied the mother’s relocation
request to California.109 The court emphasized the importance of the father’s
physical presence with his children, stating that:
Even with telephone and e-mail support to the visitation
schedule, the nature of Mr. Nighswander’s parenting
relationship with his children will transform if they move to
California. He will no longer be able to periodically meet and
confer with their teachers. He will no longer be able to attend
parent orientated events, recitals, plays, assemblies, and other
school and extracurricular events . . . . 110
Likewise, the court in Marshall v. Marshall rejected the use of webcams for
visitation and did not see virtual communication technology as capable of
fostering the same sorts of familial bonds as physically being together. 111
State legislatures have also stepped in to codify the ability of parents
to pursue virtual visitation. In 2004, Utah was “the first . . . state to
legislate the authority of judges to include virtual visitation in divorce
decrees.”112 According to Utah’s statute, “[e]ach parent shall permit and
encourage . . . reasonable and uncensored communications with the child,
in the form of mail privileges and virtual parent-time if the equipment is
reasonably available . . . .”113 It also defines “virtual parent-time” as “parenttime facilitated by tools such as telephone, email, instant messaging, video
conferencing, and other wired or wireless technologies over the Internet . . . .”114
Although Utah allows for virtual parent-time, it does not draw an equivalence
between virtual and physical contact, specifying that “[v]irtual parent-time is
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Id. at 1077–78.
Burke v. Burke, No. M2000-01111-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 921770, at *6 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Jan. 8, 2002).
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Nighswander v. Sudick, No. FA 97393793, 2000 WL 157905, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Jan. 26, 2000).
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Id. at *8.
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See Marshall v. Marshall, 814 A.2d 1226, 1233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (“While the Internet
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computer video cameras allow people to ‘feel’ closer even when separated by hundreds of
miles, such technology cannot realistically be equated with day-to-day contact between
parents and young children.”).
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designed to supplement, not replace, in-person parent-time.”115 Still, the Utah
legislature has explicitly recognized the ability of virtual communication
technology to nurture parent-child relationships when individuals are
physically separated from one another. Other states have also passed similar
statutory language to allow for virtual visitation, including Texas and
Wisconsin.116 Like Utah, both Texas and Wisconsin have made sure to
specify that virtual visitation does not replace any requirement of physical
contact between the separated parent and child.117
For decades, legislatures and courts have grappled with the question
of whether virtual communication technology can facilitate meaningful
parent-child relationships in the context of virtual visitation. In this context,
virtual communication technology is seen as a supplement, not a replacement,
for physical contact; physical contact is still perceived as superior in quality
to virtual contact. However, unlike in the immigration context, the state has
at least recognized the importance and utility of these technologies to help
maintain familial relationships. Virtual communication technology, within
the framework of proving the authenticity of marriages for the purposes of
immigrating to the United States, has largely been left unaddressed.
The reasoning behind why virtual communication technology has
been accepted in the visitation context, but not in the immigration context, is
a challenging question to disentangle. The differences in treatment could
speak to the difference in policy implications, policy motivations and the
parties involved. While virtual visitation aims to maintain parental bonds, the
immigration system, as it is currently structured, maintains couple separation.
Virtual visitation is motivated by the best interests of the child, whereas the
immigration system is motivated by preventing fraud. Virtual visitation
values parental freedom of movement, while the immigration system upholds
family separation and immigrant exclusion. Virtual visitation regulates
citizens, and the immigration system regulates non-citizens.
Child custody has an underlying motivation to keep parents
physically with their children, ostensibly towards the goal of the best interests
115
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See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.015(b) (West 2019) (“If a conservator of a child requests
the court to order periods of electronic communication with the child under this section, the
court may award the conservator reasonable periods of electronic communication with the child
to supplement the conservator’s periods of possession of the child.”); WIS. STAT. § 767.41(4)(e)
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See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.015(d) (West 2019) (“The availability of electronic
communication under this section is not intended as a substitute for physical possession of
or access to the child where otherwise appropriate.”); WIS. STAT. § 767.41(4)(e) (2020)
(“Electronic communication with the child may be used only to supplement a parent's periods
of physical placement with the child. Electronic communication may not be used as a
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of the child. Utah, Texas, and Wisconsin have all conditioned allowing virtual
visitation on meeting the best interests of the child. 118 Furthermore, social
science research suggests that robust and frequent parental involvement is
important for the development of children. 119 Geographic distance can
diminish this involvement by “reduc[ing] the frequency and duration of
contact between the child and non-custodial parent.”120 These developmental
concerns are particularly acute for young children under 7, when bonds to
parents are fragile and can more easily be damaged by prolonged periods of
separation.121 Courts and state legislatures, because they condition virtual
visitation on the fact that it is a supplement, not replacement, for in-person
visitation, share this presumption that physical contact is crucial to ensure the
best interests of the child. However, the state will allow relocation and virtual
visitation when they are holistically considered in the best interests of the
child.122 The state offers this flexibility for courts to determine what is best
for the child, whether that is relocation, virtual visitation, or otherwise.
Unlike child custody, the immigration system has no mandate to keep
in mind the best interests of the transnational couple. The immigration
system, when trying to prove the authenticity of marriages, is organized
around separation and motivated by the prevention of fraud. Starting from a
goal of protecting the best interests of the parties is a very different starting
point than ferreting out fraud. Furthermore, recognizing the viability of
virtual contact in fostering relationships, in the child custody context, allows
for children to maintain contact with a non-custodial parent who lives far
away. The same recognition, in the immigration context, allows for more
expansive access to citizenship, a benefit that has historically been
exclusionary, and more opportunities for defrauding the state. In other words,
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-33(14) (West 2020) (“Each parent shall permit and
encourage . . . virtual parent-time . . . taking into consideration: the best interests of the
child”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.015(b)(1) (West 2019) (“[T]he court shall consider: whether
electronic communication is in the best interest of the child . . . .”); WIS. STAT. § 767.41(4)(e)
(2020) (“Granting a parent electronic communication with the child during the other parent's
periods of physical placement shall be based on whether it is in the child's best interest . . . .”).
119
See Kenneth Waldron, A Review of Social Science Research on Post Divorce Relocation,
19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 337, 359 (2005) (noting that “[a] review of the research on the
effects of increased father involvement is unambiguous: a child does better in every aspect
of adjustment that has been measured, both long-term and short-term, if there is active father
involvement” and these conclusions likely also apply to mother involvement but mother
involvement is much less studied).
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Id. at 357.
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See McCoy v. McCoy, 764 A.2d 449, 454 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (recognizing
the fact that relocation increases barriers to visitation for a non-custodial parent “alone may
not be contrary to the best interest of the child, so long as an alternate visitation schedule can
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noncustodial parent.”).
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the implications for recognizing virtual communication technology look very
different for the immigration and child custody contexts. Also, the
immigration system’s “in marital union” requirement provides a statutory
basis for requiring physical togetherness that the child custody system lacks.
The child custody system also values parents’ freedom of movement,
unlike the immigration system’s emphasis on restriction of couples’
movement. Although the interests of the child are paramount, courts have
held that their decision-making around relocation should consider the
freedom of movement for the custodial parent. 123 The immigration system
does the opposite of valuing freedom of movement. Adjustment of lawful
presence status in the United States allows undocumented immigrants to
freely leave the country. 124 However, prolonged wait times for adjustment of
status and the possibility of not being able to reenter the United States
effectively trap many undocumented immigrants in the country, restricting
their freedom of movement.125
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Virtual communication technology has revolutionized the way people
communicate, but immigration law has not caught up. The Internet has
become a medium that can minimize the distance between loved ones, and
both create and foster familial bonds. There is little doubt that a long-distance
relationship maintained by virtual communication is any less real than a
relationship between two people in the same physical place. The child
custody system has integrated this technology into its relocation doctrines
and statutes. However, there is little acknowledgement of these technologies
when the state is trying to validate the marriages of immigrants who seek
lawful presence in the United States.
This difference speaks to the different motivations behind the child
custody and immigration systems. Addressing these differences goes beyond
the scope of just virtual communication technology and speaks to the historic
and current organizing principles of the immigration system. However,
recognizing virtual communication technology in the immigration context
can still be a small step towards making the system more inclusive. Below
are a few recommendations for how this recognition can be accomplished.
See, e.g. Holder v. Polanski, 544 A.2d 852, 855 (N.J. 1988) (noting that “[o]ur problem
is to balance [the rights of the noncustodial parent] with the right of the custodial parent to
seek a better life for himself or herself in this or another state. As previously noted, the
calculus for solving this problem includes the custodial parent's interest in freedom of
movement as qualified by his or her custodial obligation, the State's interest in protecting the
best interests of the child, and the competing interests of the noncustodial parent.”).
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•

Incorporate virtual communication technology into immigration
regulations: There is still a lack of clarity around how periods of
physical separation impact the “in marital union” requirement and
how the authenticity of relationships is proven. A rulemaking that
explicitly addresses how virtual communication technology can be
proof of a valid marriage could provide additional clarity. Also,
addressing virtual communication technology would be a recognition
of how more and more modern relationships are being conducted
online. Possible future pandemics and the current COVID-19
pandemic, characterized by closed borders and virtual communication,
undoubtedly make this recognition even more important.

•

Amend the “in marital union” requirement: As it exists and as it
is interpreted by DHS, the “in marital union” requirement relies on an
outdated definition of what it means to be married. As discussed,
married couples can live apart, rely on virtual communication
technology, and still be authentically married. Although DHS
recognizes this possibility, its general rule still requires couples to
“actually reside” with each other. Amending or eliminating these
requirements will make the immigration system more inclusive of
couples living apart and focused on family reunification, rather than
family separation.

•

Additional social science research: Although some research exists
on geographic distance’s impact on long-distance couples, there is
more that can be done. For example, researchers could explore the
difference between technology that allows face-to-face contact (like
Skype) and technology that relies on voice or written communication
(like phone calls and instant messaging). Also, researchers could
investigate the emergence of virtual reality and the impact it might
have on transnational relationships.

Considering the current immigration system and the politics and
discourse surrounding it, there is a low likelihood that any of these reforms
would gain traction. The United States is experiencing a drastic contraction
in immigration and an increasing virulence against immigrants. Rather than
follow popular sentiment, these proposed reforms would turn the immigration
system’s focus towards reuniting families, rather than separating them. They
would recognize the dignity of immigrant relationships that do not adhere to
the strict government definition of marriage that is tied to physical
togetherness. Historically, marriage has been one of the few clear paths to
citizenship in immigration law. Although this privileging of marriage has its
own problems, the immigration system clearly sees at least some value in
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allowing American citizens to bring their spouses to the United States.
Ironically, by placing such an emphasis on cohabitation and relying on an
outdated definition of romantic partnerships, the system is doing the exact
opposite—keeping families apart.

